One of the “basic purposes” of CEQA is to prevent significant, avoidable environmental damage by requiring project changes through the use of alternatives or mitigation measures, if feasible. (See CEQA Guidelines, § 15002(a)(3); see County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 185, 203 (County of Inyo) [“A major function of an EIR is ‘to ensure that all reasonable alternatives to proposed projects are thoroughly assessed by the responsible official’ or board.”]; see also Pub. Resources Code, § 21001(g); Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 564 (Goleta Valley II) [describing the alternatives and mitigation sections as the “core of an EIR”].)
To fulfill this purpose, an EIR must identify and describe a reasonable range of alternatives to a project or its location to foster informed decision making and public participation. (See CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.6(a).) The alternatives must feasibly attain most of the project’s basic objectives while avoiding or substantially lessening significant environmental impacts. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.6(a).) The alternatives analysis must include analysis of a “no project” alternative and identify the “environmentally superior alternative.” (CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.6(e).) Alternatives need not be described and analyzed to the same degree as the proposed project. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.6(d).) However, alternatives need to be described in enough detail to allow for comparative analysis against the proposed project. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.6(d).)
In recognition of the nearly endless range of potential project variations, an agency is not required to analyze every conceivable alternative, but is instead governed by the rule of reason. (CEQA Guidelines, §15126.6(a); Mount Shasta Bioregional Ecology Center v. County of Siskiyou (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 184, 196.) The EIR must briefly describe the rationale for selecting the analyzed alternatives and identify those that were considered during the scoping process but ultimately rejected as infeasible. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15126.6(c).) What constitutes a “reasonable range” of alternatives varies and is directed by the goal of offering substantial environmental advantages which may be “feasibly accomplished in a successful manner” considering the economic, environmental, social and technological factors involved. (See Goleta Valley II, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 566.)
CEQA “does not expressly require a discussion of alternative project locations,” yet an EIR may be found inadequate for failing to consider or adequately analyze alternative sites. (Mira Mar Mobile Community v. City of Oceanside (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 477, 491; see Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1167, 1180; San Joaquin Raptor/Wildlife Rescue Center v. County of Stanislaus (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 713, 736-739 (San Joaquin Raptor).) Though there is little guidance on when offsite alternatives must be considered, the California Supreme Court indicated that projects which are consistent with local planning documents (such as general plans and local coastal programs) do not need to analyze offsite alternatives because the long-term planning process inherently addresses and resolves alternative land use goals. (See Goleta Valley II, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 571-573.) On the other hand, where an alternative site is available and may reduce significant impacts – particularly site-specific impacts – agencies are advised to fully analyze the alternative location. (See San Joaquin Raptor, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at 736-739 [finding analysis of alternative sites inadequate and noting other sites may have lessened impacts wetlands, prime farmland, and related to sewer expansion]; San Bernardino Valley Audubon Soc’y v. County of San Bernardino (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 738, 750-751 [EIR found inadequate for failing to analyze alternative site “of less biological and archaeological sensitivity” proposed as a land trade by the Forest Service]. However, CEQA does clearly provide that EIRs for transit priority projects do not need to analyze offsite alternatives. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21155.2(c)(2).)
An agency may not approve a project with significant environmental impacts if there are feasible alternatives that would substantially lessen those effects. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21002.) Therefore, EIRs should consider alternatives that would avoid or substantially decrease significant and unavoidable impacts. (See Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 546 (Golden Door), citing Pub. Resources Code, § 21002 and CEQA Guidelines, §§ 15002(a)(3), 15021(a)(2); see also id. at pp. 546-550; Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San Diego Assn. of Governments (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 413, 435-437.) For example, the court in Golden Door ruled the lead agency violated CEQA because it failed to analyze an alternative aimed at reducing vehicle miles traveled where the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions arose from on-road transportation. (Golden Door, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 545-550.) The court also invalidated the lead agency’s finding that the project at issue was consistent with the Regional Transportation Plan and SB 375’s targets because it failed to fully analyze and disclose VMT impacts, which are used to measure GHG impacts. (Id. at pp. 540-545.) The court found that in light of “consistently clear mandate[s] to reduce VMT to help achieve target GHG emission reductions” the failure to include a reduced VMT alternative was prejudicial for precluding informed public participation and decisionmaking. (Id. at p. 548.)
CEQA focuses on whether an alternative is feasible and whether it would reduce significant impacts – not when the alternative is introduced in the CEQA process. For instance, if a new feasible alternative is identified after the DEIR is circulated and would lessen significant impacts, recirculation is only required if the new alternative is not adopted. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15088.5(a)) Accordingly, agencies may adopt an alternative not analyzed in a DEIR if the alternative would reduce one or more significant project impacts. In South of Market Community Action Network v. City and County of San Francisco (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 321 (SoMa), the court rejected a challenge to a project based in part on the fact the approved project was a variant of an alternative studied in the DEIR. (Id. at pp. 335-336.) The court explained “CEQA does not handcuff decisionmakers” to the initial project and that the purpose of evaluating alternatives is “to allow thoughtful consideration and public participation regarding other options that may be less harmful to the environment.” (Ibid.) In Western Placer Citizens for an Agricultural & Rural Environment v. County of Placer (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 890, a revised version of a project alternative was submitted after the FEIR was released, and the revised alternative was adopted as the project. (Id. at p. 895.) Because the court found that the project as approved would lessen environmental impacts, it rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the new project description required recirculation prior to adoption. (Id. at p. 906.)
Nonetheless, alternatives must be anchored to an accurate, stable, and finite project description. (See, e.g., County of Inyo, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at p. 203 [“Because the final EIR does not include a genuine ‘no project’ alternative, because its list of alternatives is not tied to a reasonably conceived or consistently viewed project, the [project] EIR does not comply with CEQA’s demand for meaningful alternatives.”].) Where the DEIR fails to provide a stable project description, the document cannot be redeemed by a robust analysis of alternatives. (See Washoe Meadows Community v. Department of Parks & Recreation (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 277, 283, 288 (Washoe); stopthemillenniumhollywood.com v. City of Los Angeles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1, 18 [explaining EIR’s analysis of “wort-case-scenario environmental effects” of “‘impacts envelope’ of project alternatives” did not satisfy CEQA].) For instance, in Washoe, the DEIR failed to identify a “preferred alternative” but did analyze five project alternatives in depth. (Washoe, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 283.) The court noted that “[w]hile there may be situations in which the presentation of a small number of closely related alternatives would not present an undue burden on members of the public wishing to participate in the CEQA process,” that EIR violated CEQA because the five alternatives were vastly different, creating different footprints and impacts on public land. (Id. at pp. 288-289.) In contrast, in SoMa, the court found that providing two options for allocation of residential and office space in a mixed use project did not violate CEQA’s stable project description mandate and upheld the adoption of a revised project which was a variant of a project alternative. (SoMa, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at pp. 333-336.)
If an agency approves a project that will have one or more significant environmental effects, it must explain why the project as proposed was selected over the alternatives and provide findings showing the rejected alternatives are infeasible. (CEQA Guidelines, § 15091(a).) Alternatives may be rejected when substantial evidence supports a finding of infeasibility based on economic, legal, social, technological, or other considerations. (See CEQA Guidelines, § 15091(a)-(b); Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 899, 949.) Even when infeasibility determinations are driven by more nuanced motivations, like a policy goal, the agency’s determination will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (See California Native Plant Society v. City of Santa Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957, 1003.)
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