On June 15, 2016, the Fourth District Court of Appeal published its opinion in Spring Valley Lake Association v. City of Victorville (D069442). The case involved a CEQA and Planning and Zoning Law challenge to a Wal-Mart project (“Project”) that was approved by the City of Victorville. After the trial court found in favor of Petitioner Spring Valley Lake Association (“Petitioner”) on some of its claims, Real Party in Interest Wal-Mart appealed and Petitioner cross-appealed.
Wal-Mart appealed the trial court’s determinations that: (1) there was no substantial evidence in support of the City’s general plan consistency finding; and (2) the EIR had inadequately analyzed the Project’s greenhouse gas emissions impacts. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment on both issues.
The general plan consistency issue turned on one policy, IM 220.127.116.11, which requires all new commercial or industrial development to generate electricity on-site “to the maximum extent feasible.” The Project was developed to be solar ready, but Wal-Mart did not commit to the installation of panels because, as explained in a response to comment, it was uncertain whether the $750,000 cost would be offset by any federal tax credits or California incentives. Without the offsets, the response stated that the installation was economically infeasible. The court interpreted this response as effectively finding that “there was no extent to which it would be feasible to require the project to generate electricity on-site, whether by solar or other means.” The court held that this finding was not supported by substantial evidence in the record because there was no mention of why non-solar methods of generating electricity on-site were infeasible. The court showed little deference to the City’s own interpretation of what was considered “feasible” in this situation.
Surprisingly, despite the policy’s ambiguous language “to the maximum extent feasible,” the court held that this was a “fundamental, mandatory, and clear” policy. As such, the Project’s failure to be in conformance with this one policy was sufficient for the court to reject the City’s general plan consistency determination. (See Endangered Habitats League, Inc. v. County of Orange (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 777, 782.)
Turning to the EIR’s greenhouse gas analysis, the court held there was conflicting evidence about whether the Project would achieve a 15-percent reduction above Title 24 standards. References in the EIR stated in some places that the figure would be 14-percent, and in others, 10-percent. Because the record did not show the Project would actually achieve the 15 percent reduction, the court held that there was no support for the City’s determination that the Project would not have significant greenhouse gas emissions impacts.
Petitioner cross-appealed the trial court’s determination that the City did not violate CEQA by failing to recirculate the EIR after it revised the traffic, air quality, hydrology, and biological resources impacts analyses. The court of appeal held that recirculation was required only for the air quality and hydrology analyses because the revisions to those sections constituted “significant new information” and the public did not have a meaningful opportunity to comment on those changes.
Petitioner also argued on appeal that the City violated the Planning and Zoning Law by failing to make all the findings required by Government Code section 66474 before approving the Project’s parcel map. In what appears to be an issue of first impression, the court agreed, relying on an Attorney General’s Opinion from 1975.
Key Point: Going forward, local governments should affirmatively address that the approval of the parcel map does not create any of the issues listed in Government Code section 66474. Local governments should also continue to make findings under Government Code section 66473.5 when approving a parcel map.
Thomas Law Group is requesting depublication of the Court’s general plan consistency discussion as it departs from the existing case law’s emphasis on deference to the agency’s determination of consistency.