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CEQA Updates

Keeping You Up-to-Date on the California Environmental Quality Act

Project Description/Piecemealing Posts


Washoe Meadows Community v. Department of Parks and Recreation (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 277

Thursday, February 8th, 2018

The First District Court of Appeal reversed the California Department of Parks and Recreation’s (“Department”) approval of the Upper Truckee River Restoration and Golf Course Reconfiguration Project (“Project”), finding that the failure to identify a preferred alternative in the Draft EIR compromised the integrity of the EIR process.

In 1984, the State of California acquired a 777-acre parcel encompassing a 2.2-mile stretch of the Upper Truckee River. The parcel was later divided into two units: the Washoe Meadows State Park (“State Park”) created to protect a wetland meadow and the Lake Valley State Recreation Area (“Recreation Area”) created to allow the continuing operation of an existing golf course.

Since the 1990s, erosion of the river bed of the Upper Truckee River has raised environmental concerns. The layout of the golf course, which altered the course of the river, apparently contributed to a deterioration of the habitat and water quality. The Project was proposed to reduce the discharge of sediment that diminishes Lake Tahoe’s clarity and at the same time to provide public recreation opportunities in the State Park and Recreation Area.

The Department issued a scoping notice including four alternative projects and identified one of the alternatives – river restoration with reconfiguration of the golf course – as the preferred alternative. In August 2010, the Department circulated a draft EIR (“DEIR”) for the project. Although the DEIR analyzed five very different alternative projects, including the four alternative projects identified in the scoping notice, it did not identify a preferred alternative. The DEIR stated that the lead agency would determine which alternative or combinations of features from multiple alternatives was the preferred alternative in the final EIR (“FEIR”).

In September 2011, the Department issued the FEIR, identifying a version of the project as the preferred alternative. After the Department approved the preferred alternative project in January 2012, the plaintiff sued. The trial court held in favor of the plaintiff.

On appeal, the court held that the DEIR’s failure to provide the public with an “accurate, stable and finite” project description prejudicially impaired the public’s right to participate in the CEQA process, citing County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 185. Noting that a broad range of possible projects presents the public with a moving target and requires a commenter to offer input on a wide range of alternatives, the court found that the presentation of five very different alternative projects in the DEIR without a stable project was an obstacle to informed public participation.

L.A. Conservancy v. City of W. Hollywood, 2017 Cal.App.LEXIS 1151

Thursday, February 8th, 2018

The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision upholding the adequacy of the environmental impact report (EIR) and supporting CEQA findings made by the City of West Hollywood (City) concerning approval of a mixed-use project on a three-acre “gateway” site in the City.

The Project, as proposed, required demolition of a building built in 1928 and remodeled in 1938, which was considered eligible for listing on the California Register of Historical Resources. The EIR acknowledged that demolition of the building constituted a significant and unavoidable impact.  As a result, the EIR included a project alternative that proposed redesigning the Project in order to preserve the historic building.  In approving the Project, the City rejected the preservation alternative, but required that portions of the historic building façade be incorporated into the Project design.

Plaintiff Los Angeles Conservancy (plaintiff) alleged that the City violated CEQA because the analysis of the preservation alternative was inadequate, the Final EIR failed to sufficiently respond to comments concerning preservation of the historic building, and evidence did not support the City’s findings that the preservation alternative was infeasible. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s petition.  On appeal, the court affirmed.

First, the court held that the EIR’s analysis of the conservation alternative was detailed enough to permit informed decision making and public participation. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the City was required to prepare a “conceptual design” for the alternative.  The court noted that no legal authority required a conceptual design to be prepared for an alternative included in an EIR.

Second, the court found that comments on the draft EIR cited by the plaintiff did not raise new issues or disclose any analytical gap in the EIR’s analysis. The court noted that to respond to comments that merely expressed general Project objections and support for the preservation alternative, the City could properly refer the commenters back to discussion included in the draft EIR concerning the historic building on the project site.

Finally, the court stated that a court must uphold the lead agency’s findings concluding an alternative is infeasible if supported by substantial evidence. In undertaking this inquiry, “[a]n agency’s finding of infeasibility… is ‘entitled to great deference’ and ‘presumed correct.’” While the court noted that the plaintiff may have demonstrated that the City could have concluded the preservation alternative was not infeasible, other evidence in the record supported the City’s determination that the alternative was impractical or undesirable from a policy standpoint.  Thus, substantial evidence supported the City’s infeasibility findings.

SECOND DISTRICT UPHOLDS CITY’S PERMITTING PROCESS FOR MALIBU HIGH SCHOOL PROJECT IN UNPUBLISHED DECISION

Friday, June 10th, 2016

In an unpublished opinion, Malibu Community Alliance v. City of Malibu, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3116, Division Seven of the Second Appellate District adjudicated a challenge to development permits granted by the City of Malibu (City) to the Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School District (District) for the installation of athletic field lights at Malibu High School. Petitioners sought a writ of mandate ordering the City to revoke the permits. The trial court denied the petition and the appellate court affirmed.

The District had previously used temporary lights for evening athletic events. Permanent field lighting was planned as part of a larger construction project on the Malibu high school and middle school campuses. After issuing the initial study, the school district learned that permanent lighting would be in violation of a condition of its coastal development permit obtained from the California Coastal Commission unless the District obtained an amendment to its campus’s coastal development permit and Malibu’s local coastal program. The District then decided to separate the field lighting project from the larger campus project and conduct an independent environmental review of each project. The District proceeded to draft an environmental impact report (EIR) for the larger construction project and a mitigated negative declaration (MND) for the field lighting project.

During the environmental review process for the EIR and the MND, multiple comments suggested that this division of the projects constituted illegal piecemealing under CEQA and that the cumulative impacts of both projects were not analyzed. In the Final EIR, the District responded to these comments and analyzed the cumulative impacts of the construction project and lighting project. The District certified the EIR, approved the construction project, and issued its notice of determination in February 2012; it adopted the MND, approved the lighting project, and issued its notice of determination in April 2012. These actions were not legally challenged.

Two months later, in June 2012, the City relied on the MND when it granted the conditional use permit to the District for the installation of the lights. It was this permitting process that Petitioners challenged, claiming that the City should have prepared a supplemental environmental review because there had been a “substantial change in circumstances” regarding the project. Specifically, Petitioners pointed to the fact that the applications for the lighting project and larger construction project were pending before the City at the same time. According to Petitioners, this caused the two separate projects to “bec[ome] one project.”

The court disagreed, holding that the timing of the applications did not constitute a substantial change that would trigger supplemental environmental review. Further, the court found that Petitioners were required to bring any claim of piecemealing within 30 days of the District filing its notice of determination and were thus precluded from collaterally attacking the environmental review under the guise of a challenge to the City’s later permitting process.

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT UPHOLDS MOJAVE DESERT GROUNDWATER EXTRACTION IN TWO PUBLISHED OPINIONS

Friday, June 10th, 2016

A proposal to pump fresh groundwater from an underground aquifer located in the Mojave Desert (“Project”) resulted in six related cases. On May 10, 2016, the Fourth Appellate District upheld the Project in all six cases: Delaware Tetra Technologies, Inc. v. County of San Bernardino, 2016 Cal. App. Lexis 380, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3434, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3438, 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3439, and Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino, 2016 Cal. App. Lexis 382 and 2016 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3441.

The proposed Project is a public/private partnership designed to prevent water waste caused by brine and evaporation, and to ultimately transport water to customers in Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura Counties. Once in operation, the Project would appropriate an average of 50,000 acre feet of groundwater over a period of 50 years. The groundwater extraction would be subject to the County’s 2002 Groundwater Ordinance, which was designed to ensure that groundwater extractions maintain safe yield of affected aquifers.

In March 2011, the Santa Margarita Water District (“Santa Margarita”) posted a notice of preparation of a draft Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”) for the Project. Under a June 2011 agreement, Santa Margarita agreed to act as the lead agency and San Bernardino County (“County”) agreed to act as a responsible agency. The Draft EIR was released for public review and comment in December 2012. During the EIR process, Santa Margarita, the County, the landowner, and Fenner Valley executed a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) in which the parties agreed that a groundwater management, monitoring and mitigation plan would be developed in connection with the finalization of the EIR. The Final EIR was certified in July 2012.

Delaware Tetra Technologies

In the first published case, Delaware Tetra Technologies, Inc. challenged the County’s resolution authorizing the execution of the 2012 MOU, arguing that the County should have completed an environmental review under CEQA prior to approving the MOU.

Applying the de novo standard of review, the Court concluded that environmental review was not required because establishing a groundwater management, monitoring and mitigation plan under the MOU would not cause a direct, or a reasonably foreseeable indirect, physical change in the environment. Moreover, the MOU did not foreclose alternatives or mitigation measures, nor commit the County to a particular course of action that would cause an environmental impact. Rather, the MOU established that the County still retained full discretion.

Center for Biological Diversity

In the second published case, the Center for Biological Diversity, the San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society, Sierra Club, and National Parks Conservation Association (collectively, “CBD”) filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the approval of the Project under CEQA. The Court concluded that Santa Margarita did not abuse its direction when it approved the Project and certified the EIR.

The court first held that Santa Margarita was properly designated as a lead agency because it was jointly undertaking the Project with the landowner and because it was the agency with the principal authority to approve and supervise the Project. Next, the Court held that the Project description, which characterized the Project as “a means of conserving water,” was not misleading because the Project would conserve water otherwise lost to brine and evaporation.

Finally, the Court rejected CBD’s contentions that the EIR did not provide an accurate duration for pumping by the Project and would result in more water being withdrawn than was contemplated and discussed by the EIR. Although the EIR recognized that the parties may choose to extend pumping for an additional term after the stated completion date of the Project, the Court found that the additional term was not reasonably foreseeable and noted that any additional term would require additional environmental review. The court further noted that the EIR did not permit withdrawal of water in excess of the amounts identified.

Key Points:

In holding that the MOU was not a “project,” the Court reaffirmed the principles of Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood (2008) 45 Cal.4th 116 regarding when an activity constitutes a “project” subject to environmental review. Memoranda of Understanding will not require environmental review under CEQA where they do not commit a lead agency to a particular course of action, foreclose alternatives or mitigation measures, or result in environmental impacts.

In addition, the Court reaffirmed in several different contexts that a court’s role is not to “pass upon the correctness of the EIR’s environmental conclusions, but only upon its sufficiency as an informative document.”  Petitioners bear the burden of describing the lead agency’s supporting evidence and showing how it is lacking.

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT UPHOLDS EIR FOR PROPOSED UCLA CONFERENCE CENTER

Monday, January 4th, 2016

In an unpublished opinion, Save Westwood Village v. Regents of the University of California, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9281, the Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s rulings and rejected several CEQA challenges to the UC Regents’ approval of the Meyer and Renee Luskin Conference and Guest Center on the UCLA campus. As noted by the appellate court, the petitioner’s opening brief could have been rejected due to its failure to provide an adequate statement of facts, its limited and inaccurate citations to the record for most of its factual assertions, and its legal analyses, which was supported by only four citations to legal authority. Despite these inadequacies, the court considered each of petitioner’s four legal argument in turn, finding each to be unpersuasive.

Specifically, the court found that the Regents did not improperly pre-commit to the proposed project when they accepted a $40 million gift from the Luskins. The court found that the Regents’ acceptance of the gift did not preclude the Regents from considering any alternatives or mitigation measures because the gift was conditioned only on the Regents using the donors’ names for the proposed conference center, providing annual reports on the status of the conference center, and using the gift for charitable purposes. Nor did the court find pre-commitment from the Regents’ approval of the project budget prior to the certification of the Final EIR because the Regents approved the project design on the same day they certified the Final EIR and the approval followed lengthy, interactive planning and review process.

The court quickly rejected petitioner’s remaining claims: (1) that there were differing project descriptions regarding the amount of square footage between the EIR and the document authorizing the expenditure of funds; (2) that the project was a legally infeasible alternative because the guest center would be used for “non-academic purposes” 25% of the time; and (3) that the EIR did not consider the impact of lost parking spaces. The court found the record did not support any of these additional claims.

The lawsuit was filed in October 2012; the unfounded and barely articulated challenges entangled the project in CEQA litigation for more than three years.

CITY OF SAN JOSE’S LANDFILL EIR UPHELD BY COURT

Wednesday, December 9th, 2015

In an unpublished opinion, City of Milpitas v. City of San Jose, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8610, the Sixth Appellate District upheld the City of San Jose’s Environmental Impact Report (EIR) prepared for the Newby Island Sanitary Landfill and Recyclery. The programmatic EIR assessed the impacts of: (1) increasing the maximum elevation of the landfill to increase the landfill’s capacity; and (2) rezoning the landfill area and Recyclery to conform to existing and proposed landfill activities.

The Court first determined that the document qualified as a programmatic EIR because it involved a comprehensive rezoning and because specific details about construction and operation were not available for a number of uses proposed as part of the project, requiring further environmental review.

Applying the substantial evidence standard of review, the Court rejected the City of Milpitas’ allegation that the City of San Jose utilized an improper baseline that incorporated changes proposed by the project into its assumptions. One of the three baselines considered in the EIR was the “existing conditions (as they are today on the ground, including proposed changes to existing operations).” The Court found that this baseline was appropriate because the EIR first considered the existing conditions and then analyzed the effects of the proposed rezoning at a “first-tier level of detail.”

The Court next addressed whether the impact analysis was adequate. With regard to the light impact analysis, the Court found that, as a program-level document, the City of San Jose’s analysis was proper. The final EIR expressly called for further environmental review for many uses that would be allowed by the rezoning, including expansion of landfill yard activities and construction of new structures. The structures would presumably comply with the City of San Jose’s lighting policy and design guidelines and any potentially significant project-specific impacts would be identified and mitigated as part of later environmental review.

The Court then turned to the EIR’s noise analysis. The City of Milpitas alleged that the final EIR would allow the relocation of certain landfill activities within an identified California clapper rail buffer and the relocation of such landfill activities was not properly analyzed in the EIR. The Court deferred to the City of San Jose’s interpretation of the buffer and found that the project would have no significant operational noise or vibration impacts. To the extent that the City of Milpitas also challenged the use of existing noise conditions in determining whether new uses would be substantially louder, the Court found that the existing noise levels were appropriately part of the environmental baseline.

On the odor analysis, the Court rejected the City of Milpitas’ argument that the final EIR failed to follow the air district’s significance thresholds for odor. The Court held that because the final EIR effectively treated odor impacts as potentially significant and identified mitigation measures to counteract those impacts, any deficiency in compliance with the air district’s guidelines threshold of significance was harmless. The City of Milpitas’ allegation that the EIR failed to analyze the odor impacts of increased landfill gas emissions was also rejected by the Court; the expert conclusion in the record was not contradicted by other expert evidence. The Court also rejected arguments raised by the City of Milpitas regarding volatile organic compounds and sulfur oxides because they were forfeited for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Even assuming the City of Milpitas had not forfeit those arguments, the Court held that it had not provided any expert evidence to support its assertions on appeal.

Finally, the Court rejected the City of Milpitas’ assertion that the EIR’s project objectives were drawn so narrowly that they precluded effective analysis of alternatives to the project. The Court recognized that CEQA does not forbid site-specific project objectives and found that the site specific nature of the EIR’s project objectives did not preclude effective alternatives analysis. The Court also held that the City Council’s conclusion that none of the alternatives was feasible was supported by substantial evidence.

Two Wins for the Railyards Development in Third District Court of Appeal

Tuesday, October 20th, 2015

This month, the Third District Court of Appeal issued two unpublished opinions on pending CEQA suits challenging the Railyards development in Sacramento. Both opinions affirm the decisions of the trial court and conclude that the City of Sacramento complied with CEQA when it adopted the Railyards Specific Plan and the Railyards Redevelopment Plan.

In Sacramento Citizens Concerned About the Railyards v. City of Sacramento (C065220, Oct. 7, 2015), the Court held that the program EIR for the Railyards Specific Plan adequately described historic and archaeological resources, provided adequate information regarding water quality impacts, appropriately described the project, did not improperly segment review of the project’s cistern, and adequately analyzed traffic and air quality impacts.

In the second case, Castro v. City of Sacramento (C062091, Oct. 9, 2015), the petitioners challenged the City’s decision to amend the 1990 Richards Boulevard Plan to remove 300 acres from its boundaries and rename it the River District Redevelopment Plan. Those 300 acres then became the new Railyards Redevelopment Plan. Petitioners challenged the City’s adoption of the Railyards Redevelopment Plan under CEQA, arguing that the EIR improperly tiered from the Railyards Specific Plan EIR, the environmental review was improperly segmented, and the EIR failed to analyze and mitigate toxic air contaminants. The Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in the City’s favor.

A Project under CEQA is the Whole of the Action Proposed

Monday, June 15th, 2015

In Mountains Recreation & Conservation Authority v. City of Whittier 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3859, the Second District Court of Appeal reiterated that a “project” under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) is not each individual governmental approval, but rather the whole of an action.

The facts leading up to the case began when the City of Whittier (City) purchased over 1,000 acres of undeveloped land, including land formerly owned by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. (Chevron) and covered in part by a conservation easement, using a grant from the Los Angeles County Regional Park and Open Space District (District). Upon purchase of the land, the City and the District entered into a Project Agreement (Agreement) requiring the City to seek the District’s approval of any proposed leases on the land. Thereafter, after certifying an EIR, the City entered into a lease with Matrix Oil Corporation for the drilling and production of oil on seven acres of the protected land (Project), yet the City did not first obtain approval from the District.

Mountains Recreation & Conservation Authority sued the District and the City, but its suit was settled and its claims were dismissed.  The District filed a cross-complaint against the City, alleging among other causes of action, that the City failed to comply with CEQA when it entered an Amendment and Partial Release of Declaration and Easement of Restricted Use with Chevron to make clear that the existing conservation easement did not prohibit the Project (Chevron Release).

With respect to the District’s CEQA claim, the District argued that the City was required to conduct environmental review of its decision to approve the “Chevron Release.”  The court explained that while approval of the “Chevron Release,” viewed in isolation, could potentially result in environmental impacts, the Release was not a distinct project on its own but rather one part of the oil drilling project as a whole that previously underwent CEQA review.  A “project” under CEQA means “the whole of the action,” not “each separate governmental approval.”  Thus, since the “Chevron Release” was one governmental approval in the midst of a larger project, the City was not required to conduct an environmental review of its approval. Furthermore, the court found that any possible environmental impacts of the “Chevron Release” were fully considered in the oil drilling project’s EIR.

Appellate Court Upholds EIR for Perris Dam Remediation Project in Riverside County

Tuesday, November 18th, 2014

In Paulek v. California Department of Water Resources, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 999, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District upheld the trial court’s denial of a writ of mandate challenging the Department of Water Resources’ (Department) approval of an environmental impact report (EIR) for a dam remediation project at Perris Dam in Riverside County.

Following a 2005 study of the dam’s foundation that found structural deficiencies, the Department developed a three-part plan for long-term improvements. The three parts included: 1) fixing the structural deficiencies in the dam’s foundation; 2) replacing the facility’s outlet tower; and 3) constructing a new emergency outlet extension. Despite an initial notice of preparation of a draft EIR that included all three parts, the final EIR did not include construction of the emergency outlet extension. Petitioner sought a writ vacating the Department’s approval of the EIR.

After establishing the petitioner had standing to bring the lawsuit, the court rejected petitioner’s argument that removal of the emergency outlet extension from the final EIR left a significant environmental impact unmitigated. The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) only requires a public agency to mitigate the environmental impacts of “projects that it carries out or approves.” The court found the danger from the current emergency outlet extension existed regardless of whether the seismic improvements were made to the other portions of the dam. As a result, the flooding danger was part of the baseline condition that did not fall within the mitigation requirements of CEQA.

The court also rejected petitioner’s argument that removal of the emergency outlet extension into a separate CEQA analysis constituted improper segmentation. While CEQA prohibits “piecemeal” review of projects to avoid a cumulative significant impact, the court found the emergency outlet was a distinct project. It was not a “reasonably foreseeable consequence” of the dam remediation and tower rebuilding because those two projects could occur and remedy the structural deficiencies without the emergency outlet extension. The outlet extension was also not an integral part of same project and not a future expansion of the dam remediation and tower rebuilding that would change the scope of their impacts. Accordingly, the project was not improperly segmented.

Finally, the court found the Department’s responses to petitioner’s comments on the EIR were adequate. Petitioner’s comments did not point to specific deficiencies in the EIR; rather, the comments generally stated the EIR was inadequate and expressed the need for mitigation. The court held the Department’s reference to portions of the EIR addressing petitioner’s concerns were sufficient stating, “a general comment only requires a general response.”

KEY POINT

The court reiterated the standard for improper segmentation of CEQA projects. Although CEQA defines project broadly in favor a comprehensive environmental review, public agencies have discretion to remove discrete portions of a project from the final EIR, even if the removed portion was included in the initial notice.

Court Upholds Discussion of Project Objectives and Alternatives in an EIR for an Infill Project in San Diego

Tuesday, August 5th, 2014

In an unpublished decision in Save Our Heritage Organisation v. County of San Diego, (2014) Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5121, the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District reversed the trial court and ordered the trial court to deny a writ of mandate challenging the adequacy of the environmental impact report (EIR) for a mixed-use development in downtown San Diego (project).

The project site contains a parking lot, warehouse, and an office building built in 1911 that the City of San Diego had previously designated as an historical structure.  The first phase of the project included demolition of the warehouse and office building and construction of a parking structure.  In the next phase, San Diego County (the County) would partner with a private developer to build a five-story office and retail building and a 19-story residential building on the remaining portions of the parcel.

While acknowledging the significant unmitigable environmental impacts of the project, the County adopted a statement of overriding considerations and approved the proposed development.  The County balanced four objectives of the project in the EIR, which included maximizing revenue, providing parking, establishing a public-private partnership, and obtaining a LEED certification.

The court first reversed the trial court’s ruling that maximizing revenue was an improper objective under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).  Save Our Heritage Organisation (SOHO) contended that maximizing revenue was too narrow of an objective because it would preclude meaningful analysis of project alternatives.  However, neither CEQA nor the CEQA Guidelines impose limits on the project objectives in an EIR and courts do not have the authority to impose a limitation such as prohibiting a certain project objective in an EIR.  Additionally, maximizing revenue was one of four objectives and not the only factor the County considered.  As a result, the court held that considering maximizing revenue as a project objective did not by itself constitute an abuse of discretion by the County.

Next, the court held that the EIR contained an adequate range of alternatives and that the evidence was sufficient to support the County’s finding that the alternatives were infeasible.  Citing Federation of Hillside & Canyon Associations v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1252, the court stated that the County’s selection of alternatives would be upheld unless they were “manifestly unreasonable.”  In this case, the County considered a no project alternative, an alternative that left the historic structure intact with buildings around it, and an alternative that incorporated the historic structure into one of the buildings.  Emphasizing that under CEQA courts should be highly deferential to an agency’s decision, the court found these alternatives were not manifestly unreasonable.

In looking at whether substantial evidence supported the County’s decision, the court stated that the feasibility of the project alternatives must be evaluated in the context of the project.  An expert analysis of the anticipated revenue from the project expected over 79 million dollars from the proposed project compared to 27 million and 29.6 million for the alternatives.  Based on this evidence, the court held that SOHO had failed to meet its burden of proving there was not substantial evidence to support the County’s decision.

Finally, the court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the County’s responses to three public comment letters were inadequate.  The three public comment letters at issue included modifications of the project alternatives. However, as the court pointed out, CEQA does not require an analysis of every possible alternative. The County explained why each suggestion was infeasible in reference to the alternatives analyzed in the EIR and, as a result, SOHO failed to meets its burden of showing the County’s responses were inadequate.