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CEQA Updates

Keeping You Up-to-Date on the California Environmental Quality Act

Posts from February, 2018


First District Court of Appeals Affirms, Remands LA Railyard Project FEIR, Attorney General Exempt from Exhaustion Requirements, CEQA Analyses Must Be Presented to Adequately Inform

Thursday, February 15th, 2018

The Port of Los Angeles meets the Pacific Ocean waters at sunrise (Pete)

In City of Long Beach v. City of L.A. (2018) 19 Cal.App. 5th 465, City of Los Angeles and real party in interest BNSF Railway Company (BSNF) (collectively “Appellants”) appealed a trial court’s judgement, which set aside certification of a final EIR approving BNSF’s railyard construction project. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed in part and remanded in part for further proceedings.

At the Port of Los Angeles, shipping containers are loaded to trains at railyard facilities for transport across the country. The Port is currently served by one “near-dock” railyard facility. Trucks take some containers to “off-dock” railyards, like BSNF’s current facility twenty-four miles from the Port. BSNF proposed a new 153-acre near-dock railyard approximately four miles from the Port, diverting traffic headed to the off-dock railyard and increasing the volume of cargo transported in the Port-railway interface.

In 2005, the harbor department issued an initial study and NOP and, later, a supplemental NOP. In 2011, the harbor department released a draft EIR for the project. In response to public comment, the harbor department revised major portions of the draft and released a revised draft EIR in September 2012 for 45-day public review. Thereafter, a final EIR (FEIR) was issued, identifying significant unavoidable environmental impacts on air quality, noise, GHG emissions, and traffic. Following public review, the board of harbor commissioners certified the FEIR and approved the project. The resolution was appealed to the Los Angeles City Council, which affirmed certification and approval of the project.

Seven consolidated petitions challenging the approval, one of which the Attorney General intervened on, were heard in Contra Costa Superior Court. In March 2016, the trial court found the FEIR deficient and issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the City of Los Angeles to set aside its project approval and FEIR certification in order to comply with CEQA. Specifically, the project description, indirect impact analysis, and cumulative impacts considerations were inadequate as were the FEIR’s analysis of noise, traffic, air quality, and greenhouse gas emissions, even with mitigation measures.

The First District Court of Appeal first addressed the Attorney General’s intervention. Where appellants argued he failed to abide exhaustion requirements, the court affirmed neither a plain reading of Public Resources Code section 21177 nor lack of clarity in the legislative history supported that he is held to such requirements. Indeed, the court found the Attorney General need not be a party in the administrative hearings or renew an issue already brought in the hearings as he is specifically exempt from both identity and issue exhaustion.

Reviewing de novo, the court agreed with the trial court that the FEIR project description was sufficient where it was not “misleading or inaccurate.” Distinguishing from San Juaquin Raptor Rescue Center v. County of Merced (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 645, this project description did not send any conflicting signals like claiming it would not increase operations where it actually will.

The court then addressed claims the FEIR failed to address indirect physical changes to the original off-dock railyards, where use was to decrease. CEQA requires all “reasonably foreseeable” indirect environmental effects be considered. Here, the near-dock site would increase cargo capacity of the Port but would not translate into an increased demand and volume of cargo. Instead, cargo amounts were expected to grow steadily per year at the Port with or without the new near-dock site. Even so, the project delayed planned expansions of the off-dock railyard and environmental effects thereof. Therefore, the court reversed on this issue.

The critical point of the court’s holding, in agreement with the trial court, was the FEIR failed to adequately inform decision makers and neighbors about the concentration of pollutants in the project vicinity. Despite Appellant’s claim they performed worst-case-scenario analyses and disclosed air quality concentration impacts, the information was spread throughout the FEIR, never analyzed or discussed, and did not disclose the regularity of significant concentrations. The court stated that the FEIR was deficient for it did not disclose or estimate how frequently and for what length of time the level of particulate air pollution in the area would exceed the standard of significance—e.g., what the duration of the worst case discussed in the FEIR would be.

The court was careful to state it did not agree with the trial court’s determination that the composite emissions or the methodology was misleading, but the analysis was instead incomplete because a reader could not compare air pollution concentrations at any given point in time. The court determined that this deficiency rendered the public and decision makers unable to consider alternatives or mitigation measures, or balance competing considerations before adopting a statement of overriding considerations.

Further, the court held while the cumulative impact analysis of noncancerous health risks were sufficient, the cumulative air quality impacts failed to be “good faith and reasonable disclosure” for the same reasons detailed above. Finally, the court upheld the FEIR’s GHG analysis, noting that the project twenty miles closer to the ship yard would result in less emissions than not building the project at all.

The court concluded by affirming the trial court’s decisions to set aside certification of the FEIR and suspend project activities until respondents act to bring ambient air pollutant concentrations and cumulative impacts into CEQA compliance. The court reversed the trial court’s judgements on the GHG emissions, noise, transportation and cumulative impact (for noncancerous health risks only).

Key Point

The Attorney General is exempt from CEQA identity and issue exhaustion requirements.

When certifying an EIR spanning many years of environmental analysis, it is important to display statistical and quantitative reports in a manner which can be understood and easily accessed by laypersons. Although the information may be present in documents, if it cannot be fairly compared and understood (here, it was spread throughout thousands of pages), it will likely not stand up to a CEQA challenge.

First District Court of Appeal Reverses Upper Truckee River Restoration and Golf Course Reconfiguration Project, Citing Lack of Identified Preferred Alternative

Thursday, February 8th, 2018

The Lake Tahoe Golf Course looking toward the Sierra Nevada

In Washoe Meadows Community v. Department of Parks and Recreation (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 277, the First District Court of Appeal reversed the California Department of Parks and Recreation’s (“Department”) approval of the Upper Truckee River Restoration and Golf Course Reconfiguration Project (“Project”), finding that the failure to identify a preferred alternative in the Draft EIR compromised the integrity of the EIR process.

In 1984, the State of California acquired a 777-acre parcel encompassing a 2.2-mile stretch of the Upper Truckee River. The parcel was later divided into two units: the Washoe Meadows State Park (“State Park”) created to protect a wetland meadow and the Lake Valley State Recreation Area (“Recreation Area”) created to allow the continuing operation of an existing golf course.

Since the 1990s, erosion of the river bed of the Upper Truckee River has raised environmental concerns. The layout of the golf course, which altered the course of the river, apparently contributed to a deterioration of the habitat and water quality. The Project was proposed to reduce the discharge of sediment that diminishes Lake Tahoe’s clarity and at the same time to provide public recreation opportunities in the State Park and Recreation Area.

The Department issued a scoping notice including four alternative projects and identified one of the alternatives – river restoration with reconfiguration of the golf course – as the preferred alternative. In August 2010, the Department circulated a draft EIR (“DEIR”) for the project. Although the DEIR analyzed five very different alternative projects, including the four alternative projects identified in the scoping notice, it did not identify a preferred alternative. The DEIR stated that the lead agency would determine which alternative or combinations of features from multiple alternatives was the preferred alternative in the final EIR (“FEIR”).

In September 2011, the Department issued the FEIR, identifying a version of the project as the preferred alternative. After the Department approved the preferred alternative project in January 2012, the plaintiff sued. The trial court held in favor of the plaintiff.

On appeal, the court held that the DEIR’s failure to provide the public with an “accurate, stable and finite” project description prejudicially impaired the public’s right to participate in the CEQA process, citing County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 185. Noting that a broad range of possible projects presents the public with a moving target and requires a commenter to offer input on a wide range of alternatives, the court found that the presentation of five very different alternative projects in the DEIR without a stable project was an obstacle to informed public participation.

Key Point

When preparing multiple project alternatives in the course of drafting a DEIR, it is imperative to identify a preferred alternative to prevent prejudicially impairing the public’s ability to participate in the CEQA process.

First District Court of Appeal Strikes Down Challenge to Categorically Exempt Project, Rejects Argument that Conditions of Approval Signal Significant Impacts

Thursday, February 8th, 2018

The iconic Coit Tower sits atop Telegraph Hill in San Francisco, viewed from the southwest (Ed Villanueva)

In Protect Telegraph Hill v. City and County of San Francisco (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 261, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court and upheld the City and County of San Francisco’s (“City”) approval of the construction of a three-story-over-basement, three-unit condominium and the restoration of an existing cottage on a 7,517-square-foot lot on the south side of Telegraph Hill (“Project”).

In September 2014, the San Francisco Planning Department (“Department”) determined that the Project was categorically exempt from CEQA. Subsequently, the Planning Commission approved a conditional use authorization for the Project. The plaintiffs appealed the Department’s decision exempting the Project from environmental review and the Planning Commission’s conditional use authorization to the San Francisco Board of Supervisors (“Board”). Both the Planning Commission and the Board imposed conditions related to pedestrian safety and possible disruption of traffic on Telegraph Hill during construction. After the Board affirmed the Planning Commission’s decisions, the plaintiffs sued the City. The trial court ruled for the City.

On appeal, calling the plaintiffs’ argument an ipse dixit, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the fact that conditions of approval were imposed on the Project meant the Project would have a significant impact. The court explained that the conditions were intended to address the ordinarily anticipated inconvenience and danger associated with significant construction activity in a congested urban environment. The court found that the conditions were not adopted out of concern that the Project would have a significant environmental effect, given that the Department approved the categorical exemptions without qualifications.

Second, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the project description was inadequate. The court found that County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 185, the only authority on which the plaintiffs relied to support their argument, was inapposite because Inyo considered the adequacy of a project description for an EIR, and not a CEQA exemption. The court held that the project description was adequate because it met the requirements in the City’s Administrative Code, though it did not meet the specifications for a project description in an EIR set forth in the CEQA Guidelines section 15124.

Third, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the unusual circumstances exception applied in this case because the Project’s location and site constraints were “unequivocally rare.” The court found that substantial evidence in the record supported the City’s determination that the Project presented no unusual circumstances with respect to the nearby intersection, views, and the site topography.

Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the City impermissibly approved the conditional use authorization because the Project was inconsistent with the general plan. The plaintiffs argued that the Project conflicted with one of the policies in the general plan, which protects access to vistas, because the Project would obscure the views from the stairway leading to Pioneer Park. The court explained that the policy directives contained in the San Francisco general plan are not strictly construed because the agency has discretion to interpret its own plans, citing San Francisco Tomorrow v. City and County of San Francisco (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 498.

Key Point

When challenging the approval of categorically exempt projects on the basis of deficient project descriptions, it is imperative to cite to precedent which specifically governs categorical exemptions. Also, it is important to note that conditions of approval on a project from a lead agency do not indicate that the project has a significant impact per se.

Placerville Historic Preservation League v. Judicial Council of California (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 187

Thursday, February 8th, 2018

The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court and upheld the Judicial Council of California’s (“Judicial Council”) certification of an EIR analyzing the relocation of a courthouse (“Project”) in the City of Placerville (“City”). The Project involves the consolidation of trial court operations from two buildings, including the Main Street courthouse, which is an historic downtown building dating from 1912, and a County administrative complex, into a new three-story building to be constructed on undeveloped land adjacent to the County jail, located less than two miles from downtown Placerville.

After the Judicial Council certified the final EIR in June 2015, the plaintiff, a group of County citizens with “a particular interest in the protection of El Dorado County’s environment,” sued the Judicial Council. Although the plaintiff’s petition alleged four deficiencies in the EIR, only one of them, the failure to treat the potential for urban decay resulting from relocation of courthouse operations as a significant environmental impact, was ultimately argued at the trial court. The trial court found in favor of the Judicial Council.

On appeal, the court concluded that under CEQA urban decay is defined as “physical deterioration of properties or structures that is so prevalent, substantial, and lasting a significant period of time that it impairs the proper utilization of the properties and structures, and the health, safety, and welfare of the surrounding community.” Citing Joshua Tree Downtown Business Alliance v. County of San Bernardino (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 677, 685, the court further provided that physical deterioration includes “abnormally high business vacancies, abandoned buildings, boarded doors and windows, parked trucks and long-term unauthorized use of the properties and parking lots, extensive or offensive graffiti painted on buildings, dumping of reuse or overturned dumpsters on properties, dead trees and shrubbery, and uncontrolled weed growth or homeless encampments.”

In applying the definition of urban decay to the facts of this case, the court held that physical deterioration was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of terminating judicial functions at the Main Street courthouse.

Finally, the court found that an informal survey submitted by a local resident that suggested that some businesses would lose revenue as a result of the Project, is little more than anecdotal evidence where the nature of the survey is not explained, including the manner in which participants were selected, the proportion of businesses participating, and the number responding that there would be no effect on their businesses. Distinguishing this case from Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1184, the court found that the administrative record in this case did not contain sufficient evidence supporting the validity of concerns about the Project impacts, such as an economic study and articles related to the risk of urban decay.

Key Point 

The First District elaborated on and applied the definitions of environmentally significant “urban decay”, and reinforced the level of evidence required to conclude that project-related physical deterioration is a significant and reasonably foreseeable consequence of a project.

Living Rivers Council v. State Water Resources Control Board (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 991

Thursday, February 8th, 2018

The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court and upheld the State Water Resources Control Board’s (“Board”) approval of a policy to maintain instream flows of Northern California coastal streams (“Policy”) for the purposes of water rights administration under Water Code section 1259.4. The Policy includes measures to protect native fish populations, including steelhead trout, coho salmon, and chinook salmon. It also establishes five principles related to the timing and rate of allowable surface water diversions and the construction of new on-stream dams.

In May 2010, the Board adopted the Policy with a Substitute Environmental Document (“SED”), in accordance with CEQA’s provisions for certified regulatory programs under Public Resources Code section 21080.5. Although the Board also prepared Subterranean Stream Delineations (“Delineations”) to identify locations in the Policy area where the Board would have permitting authority over groundwater pumping, the Board neither disclosed the locations, nor incorporated the Delineations, into the Policy. A report prepared by the Board’s consultant as part of the SED noted that the Policy’s restrictions on surface water diversions could result in depletion of groundwater as some of the surface water users would begin to divert water from other sources, including groundwater.

The plaintiff sued the Board, alleging CEQA violations. The trial court found the SED deficient and ordered the Board to, among other things, evaluate the Delineations as a potentially feasible mitigation measure for the anticipated increased use of groundwater. In response, the Board conducted additional CEQA review and certified a revised SED (“RSED”) in October 2013. The RSED evaluated the Delineations as a mitigation measure, but concluded they would not be feasible for several reasons, including: (1) the likelihood of affected persons switching to groundwater pumping was uncertain; (2) the potential shift from surface water diversions to groundwater pumping that might be caused by the Policy was unlikely to cause a significant reduction in surface water flows; (3) adoption of the Delineations would not assist the Board in regulating pumping outside the mapped areas; (4) the Delineations were based on the information available at the time they were prepared and field inspections had not been conducted; (5) the Board could consider the Delineations on a case-by-case basis even if they were not adopted as part of the Policy; and (6) the Board could regulate unacceptable impacts associated with groundwater pumping based on its authority to prohibit the unreasonable use of water. In March 2014, the plaintiff again sued the Board based on the RSED’s analysis of the anticipated increased use of groundwater pumping. The trial court held for the Board.

On appeal, the court first rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the RSED was misleading because it “equivocated” by asserting that the Policy’s impacts were uncertain or unlikely, while it simultaneously found these impacts would be significant. The court concluded the RSED fulfilled its information purpose because it clarified the basis for its conclusions and was internally consistent.

Next, the court upheld the Board’s conclusion that use of the Delineations as a mitigation measure was infeasible. First, the court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the Board relied on two legally irrelevant factors in making the conclusion, including: (1) the likelihood that surface water users would switch to groundwater pumping as a result of the Policy; and (2) the severity of the depletion of surface water flows resulting from groundwater pumping. The court found it permissible for the Board to consider these factors because the likelihood and severity of the effect were relevant in making the determination. Second, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the Board was prohibited from considering the effectiveness of a mitigation measure in determining the measure’s feasibility. The court explained that no case law precluded the Board from doing so.

L.A. Conservancy v. City of W. Hollywood, 2017 Cal.App.LEXIS 1151

Thursday, February 8th, 2018

The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision upholding the adequacy of the environmental impact report (EIR) and supporting CEQA findings made by the City of West Hollywood (City) concerning approval of a mixed-use project on a three-acre “gateway” site in the City.

The Project, as proposed, required demolition of a building built in 1928 and remodeled in 1938, which was considered eligible for listing on the California Register of Historical Resources. The EIR acknowledged that demolition of the building constituted a significant and unavoidable impact.  As a result, the EIR included a project alternative that proposed redesigning the Project in order to preserve the historic building.  In approving the Project, the City rejected the preservation alternative, but required that portions of the historic building façade be incorporated into the Project design.

Plaintiff Los Angeles Conservancy (plaintiff) alleged that the City violated CEQA because the analysis of the preservation alternative was inadequate, the Final EIR failed to sufficiently respond to comments concerning preservation of the historic building, and evidence did not support the City’s findings that the preservation alternative was infeasible. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s petition.  On appeal, the court affirmed.

First, the court held that the EIR’s analysis of the conservation alternative was detailed enough to permit informed decision making and public participation. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the City was required to prepare a “conceptual design” for the alternative.  The court noted that no legal authority required a conceptual design to be prepared for an alternative included in an EIR.

Second, the court found that comments on the draft EIR cited by the plaintiff did not raise new issues or disclose any analytical gap in the EIR’s analysis. The court noted that to respond to comments that merely expressed general Project objections and support for the preservation alternative, the City could properly refer the commenters back to discussion included in the draft EIR concerning the historic building on the project site.

Finally, the court stated that a court must uphold the lead agency’s findings concluding an alternative is infeasible if supported by substantial evidence. In undertaking this inquiry, “[a]n agency’s finding of infeasibility… is ‘entitled to great deference’ and ‘presumed correct.’” While the court noted that the plaintiff may have demonstrated that the City could have concluded the preservation alternative was not infeasible, other evidence in the record supported the City’s determination that the alternative was impractical or undesirable from a policy standpoint.  Thus, substantial evidence supported the City’s infeasibility findings.

Kutzke v. City of San Diego (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1034

Thursday, February 8th, 2018

The Fourth District of Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and upheld the City Council’s findings that a mitigated negative declaration (“MND”) prepared for a vesting tentative parcel map and related construction permits (“Project”) was inadequate.

The Project proposed subdividing a 1.45-acre lot into four lots, retaining an existing two-story residence on one lot, and constructing a new residence on each of the three remaining lots. The Project site is located in the La Playa neighborhood of the Peninsula Community Plan (“Plan”) area, which includes large single-family homes of various ages and architectural styles.

The proposed four lots would share a private driveway, but the slope of the driveway would be too steep for fire trucks to access the property. Accordingly, the Project would include the installation of standpipes near the furthest three residences, which would provide fire personnel with direct access to water connections in an emergency. The Project requested deviations from applicable development regulations, including the minimum rear yard setback, the minimum street frontage, and the maximum height for side yard retaining walls.

After the local community planning board recommended denial of the project based on concerns about fire safety, fire truck access, density, and the appropriateness of the requested deviation, the Planning Commission certified the MND and approved the Project. A citizen appealed the Planning Commission’s decision to the City Council, which found the MND inadequate and reversed the Planning Commission’s decision to approve the Project. The City Council denied the Project because it found it did not meet applicable City requirements, including consistency with the Plan and provisions for public health, safety, and welfare. The owners of the Project site sued the City, alleging violation of their civil rights, inverse condemnation, mandamus, and nuisance. The trial court held for the owners.

On appeal, the court held that evidence in the record supported the City’s findings that the Project was inconsistent with the Plan, particularly the Plan’s goals of conserving the character of existing single-family neighborhoods. The court found that opinions and objections of neighbors, along with expertly prepared renderings of the Project and photographs of the surrounding neighborhood, that lend credence to the neighbors’ opinions, sufficed to support the City’s findings.

The court also held that evidence in the record supported the City’s findings that the Project would be detrimental to public health, safety, and welfare. The record contained expert evidence showing flaws and omissions in the Project’s geotechnical report, as well as evidence showing that the configuration of the residences and steepness of the shared private driveway would present significant challenges for fire services personnel.

 

Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar, 2017 Cal.App.LEXIS 1131

Thursday, February 8th, 2018

The Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing an issue sanction against Plaintiff Creed-21 (plaintiff) on standing, which terminated the action, for the misuse of the discovery process in response to a motion for sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.030 filed by Real Party in Interest Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (Wal-Mart).

At trial, Wal-Mart repeatedly attempted to set a deposition and to obtain corporate documents from plaintiff in order to investigate plaintiff’s standing to bring the CEQA lawsuit. Wal-Mart’s first notice of deposition of the plaintiff’s person most qualified (PMQ) to appear for the deposition was issued in August of 2015.  Plaintiff did not respond to the notice or the follow-up meet and confer letter sent by Wal-Mart.  Wal-Mart set a second deposition in October of 2015.  Plaintiff refused to have its PMQ appear and Wal-Mart filed a motion to compel.  In response to the motion, the trial court ordered plaintiff produce the PMQ for the deposition and issued $3,000 in sanctions against the plaintiff.

Plaintiff did not comply with the order by either producing the PMQ or paying the sanction. Plaintiff instead sought relief from the order, which was denied.  Plaintiff was ordered to participate in a deposition on February 8, 2016.  Plaintiff again failed to comply with the order, but urged its failure to participate in the deposition on February 8, 2016, was based on a family emergency impacting one of its attorneys.  The trial court was unpersuaded.

Wal-Mart filed a motion for sanctions, which the trial court granted based on the plaintiff’s consistent refusal to comply with the court orders on discovery. The trial court issued a terminating sanction in light of the fact that its prior issuance of monetary sanctions and two court orders did not result in the plaintiff complying with discovery rules.

The court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued a terminating sanction. The court explained that the discovery statutes evince an incremental approach to discover sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination.  The trial court properly followed the progression in issuing sanctions in the case.

The court also rejected plaintiff’s claim that a terminating sanction could not be issued without a showing of bad faith. The court concluded that no decision rendered after the Civil Discovery Act of 1986 was enacted supported plaintiff’s argument.

Center for Biological Diversity v. California Dept. of Fish & Wildlife, 2017 Cal.App.LEXIS 1075

Thursday, February 8th, 2018

This Second District Court of Appeal decision concerns a challenge to the postremand judgment involving the Newhall Ranch Project issued by the trial court in response to Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204 and Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish and Wildlife (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 452.  Following the terms of the remand, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as to two issues:  the analysis of greenhouse gas emission and stickleback impacts. Judgment was rendered in favor of the California Department of Fish & Wildlife (department) and the developer as to all other issues.

The judgment further ordered that a peremptory writ of mandate be issued directing the department to decertify the portions of the EIR that address the significance of the project’s greenhouse gas emissions, and the validity of the stickleback mitigation measures. The judgment stated: “Consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion, all remaining portions of the EIR comply with CEQA.” Accordingly, the writ directed the department to void certification of portions of the EIR that address the department’s determination regarding the significance of the project’s greenhouse gas emissions and the stickleback mitigation measures.

The judgment and writ also enjoined all project activity including construction until the EIR was compliant with law. Further, the department also was ordered to “suspend” two project approvals that related directly to the EIR’s determinations regarding the significance of the project’s greenhouse gas emissions and stickleback mitigation measures, but four other approvals were left in place because no action was needed as to them “unless compliance with the Writ changes or affects” them.

Plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s judgment on remand, arguing that the trial court’s decision to decertify only a portion of the EIR and leave some of the project approvals in place violated CEQA. The court rejected plaintiffs’ challenges to the postremand judgment.

First, the court explained that Public Resources Code section 21168.9, subdivision (a) clearly allows a court to order partial decertification of an EIR following a trial, hearing, or remand. The section applies when a court finds that “any determination, finding, or decision of a public agency” is noncompliant. (Pub. Resources Code § 21168.9, subd. (a).) After making such a finding, “the court must enter an order, in the form of a peremptory writ of mandate, containing one or more of three specified mandates. (Pub. Resources Code § 21168.9, subds. (a) & (b).) One of those three mandates is voiding the agency determination “in whole or in part.” (Pub. Resources Code § 21168.9, subd. (a)(1).) When a court voids an agency determination “in part,” it must make severance findings pursuant to Public Resources Code section 21168.9, subdivision (b), to determine whether the voided portions are severable, and whether the remainder will be in full compliance with CEQA. In reaching its holding, the court distinguished LandValue 77, LLC v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 675 and Bakersfield Citizens for Local Control v. City of Bakersfield (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1184 on the basis that in those cases the courts did not make the severance findings required under Public Resources Code section 21168.9, subdivision (b).

Second, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that it was improper for the trial court to leave some project approvals in place. The court explained that under Public Resources Code section 21168.9, subdivision (b), the court is required to order “only those mandates which are necessary to achieve compliance with this division and only those specific project activities in noncompliance with this division.” Thus, if the court finds that it will not prejudice full compliance with CEQA to leave some project approvals in place, it must leave them unaffected.

Finally, the court reviewed the severability findings made by the trial court to confirm whether the court properly exercised its authority. Applying the abuse of discretion standard, the court concluded the trail court’s severability findings satisfied Public Resources Code section 21168.9, subdivision (b).

Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San Diego Association of Governments (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 413

Thursday, February 8th, 2018

As discussed above, in Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San Diego Association of Governments (2017) 3 Cal.5th 497 (“Cleveland II”), the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s decision (“Cleveland I”), and held that the EIR prepared for the San Diego Association of Governments’ (“SANDAG”) 2050 Regional Transportation Plan/Sustainable Communities Strategy (“Plan”) did not need to include an analysis of the Plan’s consistency with greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emission reduction goals of 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050, established by Executive Order (“EO”) No. S-3-05, to comply with CEQA.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Fourth District Court of Appeal for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. With respect to the other alleged deficiencies in the EIR, the Supreme Court “express[ed] no view on how, if at all, [its] opinion affect[ed] their disposition.”

In Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San Diego Association of Governments (2017) 17 Cal.App 5th 413 (“Cleveland III”), the appellate court rejected SANDAG’s argument that this case was moot because the Plan and the EIR had been superseded by SANDAG’s 2015 Plan and a 2015 EIR prepared for the 2015 Plan, respectively. The court explained that because the EIR might still be relied upon by project applicants the EIR was not superseded by the subsequent 2015 Plan EIR. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reissued its opinion addressing the issues not reviewed by the Supreme Court. The court also republished its opinion, noting that automatic depublication upon grant of review is no longer required by the California Rules of Court (as it was when the Supreme Court originally took this case).

Because the matter was not moot, the court then held that the EIR failed to address mitigation for the Plan’s GHG impacts. Finding that the EIR considered three measures that would result in little to no concrete steps toward emissions reduction and three onerous or unrealistic measures, the court concluded that it lacked the information required under CEQA – a discussion of mitigation measures that could both substantially lessen the Plan’s significant GHG impacts and be implemented in a feasible manner.

Lastly, the court exercised its discretion to consider other challenges to the EIR raised through the plaintiff’s cross-appeals. SANDAG argued that the plaintiffs forfeited these challenges by failing to obtain rulings on them from the trial court. The court explained that the forfeiture rule is not automatic and the court may exercise its discretion to excuse any forfeiture when it finds the issues sufficiently important.

Turning to these challenges to the EIR, the court held that: (1) the EIR failed to adequately discuss project alternatives because none of the project alternatives focused on significantly reducing vehicle miles traveled (“VMT”), finding that SANDAG’s own Climate Action Strategy stated that achieving the state’s GHG reduction goals would require significant reductions in VMT; (2) the EIR failed to provide adequate baseline information about exposures to toxic air contaminants and the location of sensitive receptors; (3) the EIR failed to correlate the Plan-related emissions to resulting adverse health impacts; (4) the EIR impermissibly deferred the analysis of air quality mitigation measures; (5) the EIR impermissibly understated the Plan’s growth-induced impacts on agricultural lands by failing to account for impacts to farmland of less than 10 acres put into production within the last 20 years; and (6) the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as to their concerns about the Plan’s impacts to small firms and lands redesignated rural residential.

In dissent, Justice Benke argued that the majority erred in reissuing Cleveland I as modified (i.e., Cleveland III) because the case should have been remanded to the trial court for it to determine whether the case was moot as a result of SANDAG’s certification of the 2015 EIR for the 2015 Plan.